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HEDGING – ARIADNE’S THREAD? :
OBJECTIVITY THROUGH SUBJECTIVITY IN ACADEMIC DISCOURSE
A.V. Legeyda, PhD (Kharkiv)
This research highlights the role of intersubjective hedging in academic discourse and focuses the pragmatic
mechanisms of co-existence of subjective scholars’ hedging and scientific objectivity in presenting information
hedging is meant to pursue. Patterns of interrelation between the extent of “hedging code” use and the degree of
objectivity of scientific text perception are deduced. The subjective nature of hedging as a linguistic concept is
analyzed on the grounds of the non-positivist approach. The priority of objectivity reaching as an ultimate aim of
academic discourse is questioned.
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Легейда А.В. Хеджинг – нить Аріадни? Від суб’єктивності до об’єктивності в академічному
дискурсі. Представлене дослідження фокусує роль інтерсуб’єктивного хеджинга у академічному дискурсі та
прагматичні механізми співіснування суб’єктивного авторського хеджування науковців та наукової об’єктивності
у презентації інформації, яку хеджинг покликаний забезпечити. Встановлюються патерни взаємодії між ступенем
використання кодового хеджинга та ступенем об’єктивності, із якою сприймаються наукові тексти. Суб’єктивна
природа хеджинга як лінгвістичного поняття підлягає аналізу з точки зору не-позитивістського підходу.
Приоритетність досягнення об’єктивності як первинної мети академічного дискурсу підлягає критичному аналізу.
Ключові слова: хеджинг, академічний дискурс, інтерсуб’єктивність, суб’єктивність, наукова об’єктивність,
кодовий хеджинг, мова науки, наукова неупередженість, не-позитивістський підхід
Легейда А.В. Хеджинг – нить Ариадны? От субъективности к объективности в академическом
дискурсе. Данная работа фокусирует роль интерсубъективного хеджинга в академическом дискурсе и
прагматические механизмы сосуществования субъективного авторского хеджинга ученых и научной
объективности в презентации информации, которую хеджинг призван обеспечить. Устанавливаются паттерны
взаимодействия между степенью использования кодового хеджинга и степенью объективности, с которой
воспринимаются научные тексты. Субъективная природа хеджинга как лингвистического понятия подвергается
анализу с точки зрения не-позитивистского подхода. Приоритетность достижения объективности в качестве
основной задачи академического дискурса подвергается критическому анализу.
Ключевые слова: хеджинг, академический дискурс, интерсубъективность, субъективность, научная
объективность, “кодовый хеджинг”, язык науки, научная беспристрастность, не-позитивистский подход
“Contrariwise,’ continued Tweedledee, ‘if it was so,
it might be; and if it were so, it would be;
but as it isn’t, it ain’t. That’s logic.”
( Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass
And What Alice Found There)
© A.V.  Legeyda, 2011
Nowadays one cannot underestimate the role of
hedging in the relationship between the language and
the situations it relates to. The necessity of hedging
and communicative models incorporating it for discourse
(academic discourse in this case), as well as for
behavioural phenomena in general [33, с. 15], has been
argued for by many scholars: “…the language is full of
figures today: most of the figures are given implicitly
or explicitly, with a qualification as to the degree of
certainty. The population of a town, an industrial output,
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a distance, a temperature, a duration, a speed, a
percentage, etc. How are we to find our way about?
An approximate value, as common sense says, is that
which is not exact. Is it a lie then? ... No! Talking and
thinking by means of “about”, “nearly” is a necessity”
[15, с. 126]. As scholars put it, hedging is not absent
even from contexts where one would expect exactitude:
science, economics, medicine, etc. The “direction of
fit” [10] of the language and the world is predominantly
the case where language is required to fit the world.
Communicative hedging (see [5] for the interpretation
of terminological and conceptual differences between
hedging and similar linguistic concepts of vagueness,
approximation, etc.), firstly manifests itself in the ability
of language to incorporate flexibility to adapt to the
constantly changing world; secondly, in the ability to
reflect many things in the world which are themselves
vague, or “perceived as vague, subject as our perception
is to physiological and neurological constraints” [10, с.
5]. Thus, as a result of the accepted direction of the
above-mentioned “fit”, discourse as such and academic
discourse as its genre, do incorporate hedging.
The recent proliferation of international research
on the topic of hedging in academic discourse testifies
to the obvious interest of linguists to this feature of
communication, hence, to its crucial importance for the
general studies of the essence of language as such [1;
5; 11; 12; 14; 17; 19; 21; 23; 25; 28; 30; 31, etc].
According to David Banks [8, c. 3], hedging has become
“one of the central questions of ESP”. The cause of
such particular linguistic attention to hedging may be
accounted for by its social function manifesting itself
in making statements subjective and complying with
the standards our community compels us to accept.
There is no denying the fact that our language – be it
academic discourse or interpersonal one – is totally
abundant with hedging, which enables one to modulate
and mitigate according to the existing linguistic
stereotypes using the respective linguistic repertoire
of the given culture. Alongside, it is a universally
acknowledged fact that science, scientific discourse
likewise, aspires to objectivity in research.
The aim of this paper is to trace the theoretical
patterns of co-existence of the intersubjective
message of hedging (intersubjectivity is a term used
in philosophy, psychology, sociology and anthropology
to describe a condition somewhere between subjectivity
and objectivity, one in which a phenomenon is personally
experienced subjectively but by more than one subject)
as a pragmalinguistic feature in academic discourse
and the objectivity in science that the above-mentioned
type of discourse is meant to pursue. This task has so
far been left off the well-trodden path of the
considerable amount of the mentioned research [see
above] in this area and proves the expediency of our
approach. Thus, the object of this research is
represented by hedging within the framework of
international academic discourse, while the subject is
interpreted as pragmatic mechanisms owing to which
we reach objectivity through subjectivity in science.
The empirical corpus of this research was constituted
by various genres of academic discourse analyzed from
the perspective of socially-constructed hedging.
The use of hedging in the research by members of
academic professional community has been effectively
described by T. Varttala, stating that “…members of
academia should rather assume or suggest when they
address other scholars. Similarly, in the place of saying
how things are, one should sometimes preferably say
how things might be, or how things perhaps are” [30,
c. 178] (this refers one once again to the epigraph of
this paper). F. Salager-Meyer [29] also identifies quasi-
obligatory softening or mitigation of criticisms as a
typical feature of the late 20th century Anglo-Saxon
academic discourse and postulates that the “directness”
of critical speech acts depends on text-types and
discipline.
While the academic community imposes a certain
“hedging code” upon its members for their works to
be socially acceptable, hedging may also be viewed,
and here we once again tend to agree with F. Salager-
Meyer [28; 29, c. 144], as a complex “mulitiform relation
that exists between thought, language and society”, as
a “product of a mental attitude…, a typically mental
phenomenon that we express linguistically by resorting
to certain forms/expressions containing elements of
tentativeness and possibility. It cannot be said, however,
that there exists a necessary relation between the use
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of such expressions and the presence of hedges”. In
clarifying the phenomenon of hedging in academic
discourse and supporting the opinion of F. Salager-
Meyer, we disagree with the positivist approach
suggested by P. Crompton [12, c. 271] claiming that
“unless or until a definition and a clear description [of
hedgings] can be achieved, there seems little hope of
studying or teaching the phenomenon consistently”. To
dismiss such a radical approach, one may refer to the
works by I. Kant, who stated that “mathematization”
of knowledge is impossible except in the realm of
mathematics, where “the exactness of mathematics
depends on definitions, axioms and demonstrations” [18,
c. 211] and that more often than not “clear and precise
definitions can (but not always) be stated upon the
completion of the research, not at the outset”.
Questioning ourselves about how it is possible to
combine communicative vagueness and tentativeness
with preserving the factual accuracy in presenting the
information in academic discourse, as well as tracing
the borderline between the subjectivity of hedging as a
communicative feature and the pursued objectivity of
the language of science presented, we have adopted
the following view: though science is in constant search
of clarifying and defining the basic concepts, supporting
its theories, hypotheses and discussions, it does not imply
in any case that exclusively precise descriptions of
scientific findings or minimalistic interpretations of the
results achieved constitute a prerequisite of the scientific
language style. Quite paradoxically, greater success
(judging by the extent of hedging used in academic
discourse of the scientific corpora analyzed) can be
granted by resorting to the language of modulation and
camouflage where the degree of hedging seems to be
directly proportional to the degree of objectivity with
which the scientific claim is perceived by the audience.
This view is shared by F. Salager-Meyer [28, c. 133]
who asserts: “…the view is often defended that science
should be built on clear and sharply defined basal
concepts, but in actual fact, no science, not even the
most exact, begins with such definitions”. It may be,
thus, concluded, that our interpretation of hedging feature
in academic discourse in terms of Ariadne’s thread to
objectivity is well-justified.
Having decided upon the nature of co-existence of
subjective hedging and scientific objectivity, we
stumbled upon the problem of the degree of subjectivity/
objectivity in the definition of hedging itself. Most
linguists dealing with the phenomenon of hedging [23;
28; 29; 32 among them] rely on the pure subjective
perception of hedges and on their own consciousness
to identify them. They tend to remark that “we realize
that straightforward plus/minus values are alien to
hedges. Hedges are a matter of degree, and it is not
always easy to mark off hedges from non-hedges…The
development of objective criteria for ways of speech
that are characterized by hedges…is difficult. The
interpretation of a specific formulation as a hedge or
non-hedge rests significantly on the subjective
assessment capacity of the reader” [32, c. 141, 144].
R. Markkanen and H. Schroeder in their analysis of
hedging in academic texts go even further, claiming
that “the concept of hedges has lost its clarity and
sometimes seems to have reached a state of definitional
chaos, as it overlaps with several other concepts. This
problem concerns many other linguistic concepts and
their definitions, beginning with the concept of
“language” itself” [23, c. 15]. The above claimed echoes
with the general finding, that it is apparently impossible
to describe meanings (meanings of hedges among
them) without the profound consideration of the context.
This conclusion calls into question the necessity to avoid
cases of decontextualized meaning, supporting the
opinion of J. Lyons [22, c. 140]: “…the notion of
sentence meaning is arguably dependent, both logically
and methodologically, upon the notion of utterance
meaning, so that one cannot give a full account of
sentence-meaning without relating sentences”.
It is postulated by this research that hedging in
academic discourse is highly subjective as it is grounded
on the intentionality of the author of the text, which
itself is purely subjective. However, the general
orientation of hedging in academic discourse is towards
promoting objectivity in science. The above symbiosis
pushes forward a question: is scientific writing purely
objective reporting of facts, methods, discussions and
findings? It is an accepted stereotype that objectivity
must be seen as a priority in scientific research.
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However, more and more scholars [13; 28; 29] tend to
postulate the view that objectivity only manifests itself
in the intention of the researchers to reach it, while the
realization of this pursuit is largely unattainable.
Nowadays linguists [14; 16; 31] even venture as far as
to suggest that the idea of scientific objectivity is nothing
more than subjectivity hidden behind the approach of
scientific impartiality supported by positivists. One may
refer here to W. Grabbe and R. Kaplan, who claim
that “…the notion of scientific writing as pure objective
reporting is a myth promulgated by the science
community itself. Objective fact is only what the
dominating group says it is; and the reporting of
objective knowledge becomes the means by which the
myth is maintained” [14, c. 205], to E. Ventola, stating
that “academic texts are not more objective than other
texts; they are simply more effective at hiding
subjectivity linguistically” [31, c. 170] and, finally, to
M. Horkheimer criticizing the issue of scientific
subjectivity and arguing that “science is positivist and
fetishist as it falsely presents itself as purely objective
and ignores the social genesis of problems, the situations
in which science is used and the purposes to which the
results of scientific investigation are applied” [16, c.
84].
Thus, our research focuses:
· the importance of non-positivist approach to the
language of science;
· a whole lot of mental life behind and beyond the
formal visible signs of the language;
· the interpretation of the above-mentioned mental
life in terms of intersubjectivity;
· and, finally and primarily, the role of hedging as a
key linguistic element of promotion of
intersubjectivity in academic discourse, as well as
in language as such, understood by us as a complex
and multidimensional phenomenon.
A perfect inference was drawn by F. Salager-
Meyer, summarizing the postulate of our research
“objectivity through subjectivity” and setting the
appropriate theoretical framework for its continuation:
“…too frequently, language expresses more or less of
what we have in mind. This is the true essence of
hedges; not accepting this leads to the denial of their
very existence. A science of language that does not
take into account the singular essence of its object is
not linguistics; it is not grammar either; it could not
even pretend to be graphology” [29, c. 173].
The prospects of the above research may lie within
the framework of conducting a conceptual analysis of
hedging as intersubjectivity signal in the academic
discourse.
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